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Abstract. A protocol with the potential of beating the existing distance records
for conventional quantum key distribution (QKD) systems is proposed. It borrows
ideas from quantum repeaters by using memories in the middle of the link, and
that of measurement-device-independent QKD, which only requires optical source
equipment at the user’s end. For certain memories with short access times, our
scheme allows a higher repetition rate than that of quantum repeaters with single-mode
memories, thereby requiring lower coherence times. By accounting for various sources
of nonideality, such as memory decoherence, dark counts, misalignment errors, and
background noise, as well as timing issues with memories, we develop a mathematical
framework within which we can compare QKD systems with and without memories. In
particular, we show that with the state-of-the-art technology for quantum memories,
it is possible to devise memory-assisted QKD systems that, at certain distances of
practical interest, outperform current QKD implementations.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Bg, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Ex
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1. Introduction
Despite all commercial [1] and experimental achievements in QKD [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10], reaching arbitrarily long distances is still a remote objective. The fundamental
solution to this problem, i.e., quantum repeaters, is known for over a decade. From early
proposals by Briegel et al. [11] to the latest no-memory versions [12, 13, 14], quantum
repeaters, typically, rely on highly efficient quantum gates comparable to what we may
need for future quantum computers. While the progress on that ground may take some
time before such systems become functional, another approach based on probabilistic
gate operations was proposed by Duan and co-workers [15], which could offer a simpler
way of implementing quantum repeaters for moderate distances of up to around 1000 km.
The latter systems require quantum memory modules with high coupling efficiencies to
light and with coherence times exceeding the transmission delays, which are yet to
be achieved together. In this paper, we propose a protocol that, although is not as
scalable as quantum repeaters, for certain classes of memories, relaxes, to some extent,
the harsh requirements on memories’ coherence times, thereby paving the way for the
existing technologies to beat the highest distance records achieved for no-memory QKD
links [2]. The idea behind our protocol was presented in [16], and independent work
has also been reported in [17]. This work proposes additional practical schemes and
rigorously analyses them under realistic conditions.
Our protocol relies on concepts from quantum repeaters, on the one hand, and the
recently proposed measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD), on the other.
The original MDI-QKD [18] relies on sending encoded photons by the users to a middle
site at which a Bell-state measurement (BSM) is performed. One major practical
advantage of MDI-QKD is that this BSM can be done by an untrusted party, e.g.,
the service provider, which makes MDI-QKD resilient to detector attacks, e.g., time-
shift, remapping, and blinding attacks [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. The security
is then guaranteed by the reverse EPR protocol [27]. Another practical advantage is
that this BSM does not need to be a perfect measurement, but even a partial imperfect
BSM implemented by linear optical elements can do the job. In our scheme, by using
two quantum memories at the middle site, we first store the state of the transmitted
photons in the memories, and perform the required BSM, only when both memories
are loaded. In that sense, our memory-assisted MDI-QKD is similar to a single-node
quantum repeater, except that there is no memories at the user’s end. This way, similar
to quantum repeaters, we achieve a rate-versus-distance improvement as compared to
the MDI-QKD schemes proposed in [18, 28, 29, 30], or other conventional QKD systems
that do not use quantum memories.
There is an important distinction between our protocol and a conventional quantum
repeater system that relies on single-mode memories. In such a quantum repeater link,
which relies on initial entanglement distribution among neighbouring nodes, the repeat
period for the protocol is mainly dictated by the transmission delay for the shortest
segment of the repeater system [31, 32]. In our scheme, however, the repeat period is
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constrained by the writing time, including the time needed for the herald/verification
process, into memories. This implies that using sufficiently fast memories, i.e., with
short writing times, one can run our scheme at a faster rate than that of a quantum
repeater, thereby achieving higher key generation rates, as compared to conventional
QKD links, and at lower coherence times, as compared to probabilistic repeater systems.
This increase in clock rate is what our proposal shares with the recently proposed
third generation of quantum repeaters, which use quantum error correction codes to
compensate for loss and errors, thus also being able to speed up the clock rate to
local processing times [12]. The need for long coherence times remains one of the key
challenges in implementing the first generations of quantum repeaters before the latest
no-memory quantum repeater proposals can be implemented.
The above two benefits would offer a midterm solution to the problem of long-
distance QKD. While our scheme is not scalable the same way that quantum repeaters
are, it possibly allows us to use the existing technology for quantum memories to improve
the performance of QKD systems. In the absence of fully operational quantum repeater
systems, our setup can fill the gap between theory and practice and will become one of
the first applications of realistic quantum memories in quantum communications.
It is worth mentioning that the setups we propose here are compatible with different
generations of hybrid quantum-classical (HQC) networks [33]. In such systems, home
users are not only able to use broadband data services, but they can also use quantum
services such as QKD. MDI-QKD offers a user-friendly approach to the access part of
such networks as the end users only require source equipment. Whereas, in the first
generation of HQC networks, the service provider may only facilitate routing services
for quantum applications, in the future generations, probabilistic, deterministic, and
eventually no-memory quantum repeaters constitute the quantum core of the network.
In each of these cases, our setups are extensible and compatible with forthcoming
technologies for HQC networks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we describe our proposed
schemes and the modelling used for each component therein. Section III presents our
key rate analysis, followed by some numerical results in Section IV. Section V concludes
the paper.
2. System Description
Our scheme relies on “loading” quantum memories (QMs) with certain, unknown, states
of light. This loading process needs to be heralding, that is, by the end of it, we should
learn about its success. Within our scheme, two types of memories can be employed,
which we refer to by directly versus indirectly heralding QMs. Some QMs can operate in
both ways, while some others are more apt to one than the other. By directly heralding
memories we refer to the class of memories to which we can directly transfer the state
of a photon and we can verify—without revealing or demolishing the quantum state—
whether this writing process has been successful. An example of such memories is a
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trapped atom in an optical cavity [34]. In the case of indirectly heralding memories,
a direct writing-verification scheme may not exist. Instead, we assume that we can
entangle a photonic state with the state of such QMs [15, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40], and
later, by doing a measurement on the photon, we can effectively achieve a heralded
writing into the memory. These two approaches of writing cover most relevant practical
examples to our scheme.
The scheme for directly heralding memories works as follows [16, 17]; see figure 1(a).
The two communicating parties, Alice and Bob, send BB84 encoded pulses [41], by either
single-photon or weak laser sources, towards QM units located in the middle of the link.
Each QM stores a photon in a possibly probabilistic, but heralding, way. Once both
memories are loaded, we retrieve their states and perform a BSM on the corresponding
photons. A successful BSM indicates some form of correlation between the transmitted
bits by Alice and Bob.
We can easily extend the above idea to the case of indirectly heralding memories.
An additional BSM, on each side, along with an entangling process between photons
and QMs, can replace the verification process needed for directly heralding memories.
In this case, see figure 1(b), a successful BSM between the transmitted photon by the
users and the one entangled with the QM, would effectively herald a successful loading
process, that is, the state of the QM is correlated with the quantum state sent by the
users.
In order to entangle a QM with a photon, one can think of two standard ways. One
approach would be to generate a pair of entangled photons, e.g., by using spontaneous
parametric down-converters [42, 43], and then store one of the photons in the memory
and use the other one for interference with the incoming photon sent by the user. While
this approach is not fully heralding (because we cannot be sure of the absorption of the
locally generated photon by the memory), it is still a viable option for highly efficient
writing procedures. Another approach to entangle a photon with a memory, which this
paper is mainly concerned with, is to start from the memory and generate a photon
entangled with the memory by driving certain transitions in the memory [40, 15]. With
entangling times as short as 300 ps reported in the literature [44], high repetition rates
are potentially achievable for indirectly heralding memories.
In either approach, it is possible to have multiple-excitation effects, which can
cause errors in our setup. In this paper, for readability reasons, we make the simplifying
assumption of having only single excitations in the memories, and address the multiple
excitation effect in a separate publication [45]. Furthermore, here we only consider
the polarization entanglement. The extension to other types of entanglement is
straightforward and will be dealt with in forthcoming publications.
Under all above assumptions, suppose once we entangle the memory A with a single
photon P , the joint state of the two is given by
1√
2
[|sH〉A|H〉P + |sV 〉A|V 〉P ], (2.1)
where |H〉P and |V 〉P , respectively, represent horizontally and vertically polarized single
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Figure 1: (a) MDI-QKD with directly heralding quantum memories. Alice
and Bob use the efficient BB84 protocol to encode and send pulses to their
respective QM in the middle of the link. At each round, each QM attempts
to store the incoming pulse. Once they are both loaded, we retrieve the
QMs’ states and perform a BSM on the resulting photons. (b) MDI-QKD
with indirectly heralding quantum memories. At each round, an entangling
process is applied to each QM, which would generate a photon entangled, in
polarization, with the QM. These photons interfere at the BSM modules next
to the QMs with incoming pulses from the encoders. As soon as one of these
BSMs succeeds, we stop the entangling process on the corresponding QM,
and wait until both QMs are ready for the middle BSM operation. In this
case, QMs are not required to be heralding; a trigger event is declared by the
success of the BSM located between the QM and the respective encoder.
(c) The original MDI-QKD protocol [18]. (d) One possible energy-level
configuration for a QM suitable for polarization encoding.
photons, and |sH〉A and |sV 〉A are the corresponding memory states; see figure 1(d). In
equation (2.1), the conditional state of the photon, knowing the memory state, has the
same form as in BB84. Each leg of figure 1(b), from the user end to the respective QM,
is then similar to an asymmetric setup of the original MDI-QKD scheme as depicted in
figure 1(c). The working of the system in figure 1(b) will then follow that of the original
MDI-QKD. We will use this similarity in our analysis of the system in figure 1(b).
The main advantage of our scheme as compared to the original MDI-QKD, in
figure 1(c), is its higher resilience to channel loss and dark count. In the no-memory
MDI-QKD, both pulses, sent by Alice and Bob, should survive the path loss before a
BSM can be performed. The key generation rate then scales with the loss in the entire
channel. In our scheme, each pulse still needs to survive the path loss over half of the link,
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but this can happen in different rounds for the signal sent by Alice as compared to that
of Bob. We therefore achieve the quantum repeater benefit in that the key generation
rate, in the symmetric case, scales with the loss over half of the total distance. Moreover,
in the case of directly heralding memories, our scheme is almost immune against dark
counts [17]. This is because the measurement efficiency in the BSM module is typically
a few orders of magnitude higher than that of dark count rates. Dark counts will then
only sightly add to the error rate. In our scheme, memory decoherence errors play a
major role as we will explain in this and the following sections.
In the following, we describe the protocol and its components in more detail.
2.1. Protocol
In our protocol, Alice and Bob, at a rate RS, send BB84 encoded pulses to the middle
station (dashed boxes in figure 1). At the QMs, for each incoming pulse, we either
apply a loading process by which we can store the state of the photons into memories
and verify it, or use the indirectly heralding scheme of figure 1(b). Once successful
for a particular QM, we stop the loading procedure on that QM, and wait until both
memories are loaded, at which point, a BSM is performed on the QMs. The BSM
results are sent back to Alice and Bob, and the above procedure is being repeated until
a sufficient number of raw key bits is obtained. The rest of the protocol is the same
as that of MDI-QKD. Sifting and postprocessing will be performed on the raw key to
obtain a secret key. In this paper, we neglect the finite-size-key effects in our analysis
[29].
2.2. Component modeling
In this section, we model each component of figure (1) including sources and encoders,
the channel, QMs, and the BSM module.
2.2.1. Sources and encoders We consider two types of sources: ideal single-photon
sources and phase-randomized weak laser pulses. The latter will be used in the decoy-
state [46] version of the protocol. Each source, at both Alice’s and Bob’s sides, generates
pulses at a rate RS. Each pulse is polarization encoded in either the rectilinear (Z) or
diagonal (X) basis. In the case of ideal single photons, we, correspondingly, send states
|H〉 and |V 〉 in the Z basis, and (|H〉 + |V 〉)/√2 and (|H〉 − |V 〉)/√2 in the X basis.
In each basis, the two employed states, respectively, represent bits 1 and 0. In the
case of the decoy-state protocol, the single-photon states are replaced with weak phase-
randomized coherent states of the same polarization. Here, we use the efficient version
of BB84 encoding, where the Z basis is used much more frequently than the X basis [47].
The pulse duration is denoted by τp and it is chosen in accordance with the requirements
of the memory system in use.
There are several sources of nonideality one may be concerned with at the encoder
box. For instance, in [48], one major source of error is in not generating fully orthogonal
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states in each basis. Note that secure exchange of keys may still be possible, although
at a possibly reduced rate, by using even uncharacterised sources [49]. Another possible
issue would be in having multiple-photon components if one uses parametric down-
converters to generate single photons [50, 51]. Although all these issues, among others,
are important in the overall performance of the system, here we would rather focus on
the memory side of the system, which is newly introduced, and deal with the details of
source imperfections, and their effects on the secret key generation rate in a separate
publication [45].
2.2.2. Channels The distance between Alice (Bob) and the respective QM is denoted
by LA (LB). The total distance between Alice and Bob is denoted by L = LA + LB.
The transmission coefficient for a channel with length l is given by
ηch(l) ≡ exp (−l/Latt), (2.2)
where Latt is the attenuation length of the channel (roughly, 22 km for 0.2 dB/km of
loss).
The channel is considered to have a background rate of γBG per polarization mode,
which results in an average pBG = 2γBGτp background photons per pulse. This can
stem from stray light or crosstalk from other channels, especially if classical signals are
multiplexed with quantum ones in a network setup [6, 5, 52, 53, 54].
We also consider setup misalignment in our analysis. We assume certain
polarization maintenance schemes are in place for the Alice’s and Bob’s channels, so
that the reference frames at the sources and memories are, on average, the same. We,
nevertheless, consider a setup misalignment error probability edK , for K = A,B, to
represent misalignment errors in each channel.
2.2.3. Quantum memories We use the following assumptions and terminologies for
the employed QMs. This list covers most relevant parameters in an experimental setup
relying on polarization encoding, whether the QM is operated in the directly or indirectly
heralding mode.
• In the case of a successful loading, each QM in figure 1 ideally stores a polarization
qubit corresponding to the polarization of the incoming pulse. We assume that
such a squashing operation occurs [55, 56] even if at the input of the QM there is a
non-qubit state, e.g., a phase-randomized coherent state. That is, if, for instance,
two photons with horizontal polarizations are at the input of the memory, the
QM would only store the polarization information, and ignores the photon-number
information. In practice, the loading efficiency would be a function of input photon
numbers, but, for simplicity, here we neglect this dependence. This is in line with
our single-excitation assumption we have adopted in this paper. One suitable
energy level structure for such a memory is the double-Λ configuration in figure 1(d),
with a common ground state and two other metastable states corresponding to two
orthogonal polarizations. The excited states can then facilitate Raman transitions
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from the ground state to each of the metastable states, using known optical
transition techniques [57, 58], in response to the input polarization state.
We assume that each QM only stores one spatio-temporal mode of light. Our
protocol can be extended to incorporate multimode QMs [59, 60, 61, 62] or multiple
QMs [31], in which case a linear improvement in the rate is expected. In this work,
we focus on the case of a single logical memory per user and leave extensions to
future work.
• For directly heralding memories, we denote the QM’s writing efficiency by ηw. The
writing efficiency is the probability to store a qubit and herald success conditioned
on having a single-photon at the QM’s input. Note that ηw also includes the
chance of failure for our verification process. For indirectly heralding memories,
we introduce an entangling efficiency, ηent, which is the probability of success for
entangling a photon with our QM.
• We denote the QM’s reading efficiency by ηr. That is the probability to retrieve a
single photon out of the QM conditioned on a successful loading in the past. The
reading efficiency is expected to decay over a time period t as ηr(t) = ηr0 exp [−t/T1],
where T1 is the memory amplitude decay time and ηr0 is the reading efficiency right
after loading. In our example of a double-Λ-level memory of figure 1(d), such a
decay corresponds to the transition form one of the metastable states |sH〉 or |sV 〉
to the ground state |g〉, in which case, no photon will be retrieved from the memory.
• We denote the QM’s writing time by τw. For directly heralding memories, it is
the time difference between the time that a pulse arrives (beginning of the pulse)
at the QM and the time that a successful/unsuccessful loading is declared. This
is practically the fastest repeat period one can run our protocol. In the case of
indirectly heralding memories, τw includes the time for the entangling process as
well as that of the side BSM operation. Accounting for such timing parameters
is essential in enabling us to have a fair comparison between memory-assisted and
no-memory QKD systems.
One must note that in a practical setup there will be time periods, e.g., for
synchronization purposes or memory refreshing, over which no raw key is exchanged.
The total number of key bits exchanged over a period of time must therefore exclude
such periods once the total key generation rate is calculated. In our work, we neglect
all these overhead times, with the understanding that one can easily modify our
final result by considering the percentage of the time spent on such processes within
a specific practical setup.
• We denote the QM’s reading time by τr. It is the time difference between the time
that the retrieval process is applied until a pulse (end of the pulse) is out.
• We denote the QM’s coherence (dephasing) time by T2. For an initial state ρ(0) of
the QM at time zero, its state at a later time t is given by [31]
ρ(t) = p(t)ρ(0) + [1− p(t)]Zρ(0)Z, (2.3)
Memory-assisted measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution 9
where p(t) = [1 + exp(−t/T2)]/2. Note that dephasing would only occur if we are
in a superposition of Z eigenstates, e.g., the eigenstates of X . The above model of
decoherence is expected to have more relevance in some practical cases of interest
[34, 40, 31] than the model used in [17], in which the memory state switches suddenly
from an intact one to a fully randomized version after a certain time. We discuss the
implications of each model in our numerical result section. It is, however, beyond
the scope of this paper to fully model every possible decoherence mechanisms in
QMs. Specific adjustments are needed if one uses a memory that is not properly
modelled by our T1 and T2 time constants.
2.2.4. BSM module Figure 2 shows the schematic of the BSM module used in our
analysis. This module enables an incomplete BSM over photonic states. In order to use
this module, in our scheme, we first need to read out the QMs and convert their qubit
states into polarization-encoded photons. The BSM will then be successful if exactly
two detectors click, one H-labelled and one V -labelled. Depending on which detectors
have clicked and what basis is in use, Alice and Bob can identify what bits they ideally
share [28].
We assume the BSM module is symmetric. We lump detector quantum efficiencies
with other possible sources of loss in the BSM module and denote it by ηd for each
detector. We also assume that each detector has a dark count rate of γdc, which results
in a probability pdc = γdcτp of having a dark count per pulse. The implicit assumption
here is that the retrieved and the writing photons have the same pulse width. Finally,
we assume that there is no additional misalignment error in the BSM module.
DH1 DH2DV2DV1
50-50
PBS PBS
BS: Beam splitter
BSM BS PBS: Polarizing BS
Figure 2: Bell-state measurement module for polarization states.
3. Key Rate Analysis
In this section, we find the secret key generation rate for our proposed schemes in
figures 1(a) and 1(b). The common assumption in our predicting the relevant observed
parameters in a QKD experiment is that we work under the normal mode of operation,
where there is no eavesdropper present, and we are only affected by the imperfections of
the system, behind which an eavesdropper can in principle hide. We later compare our
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results with two conventional QKD schemes, namely, BB84, summarized in Appendix
A, and the original MDI-QKD in figure 1(c), summarized in Appendix B, that use no
memories. In all cases, we consider both single-photon and decoy-state sources. In all
forthcoming sections, f denotes the inefficiency of the error correction scheme, i.e., the
ratio between the actual cost of error correction and its minimum value obtained by the
Shannon’s theorem, assumed to be constant, and we denote the binary entropy function
as h(p) = −p log2(p)− (1− p) log2(1− p), for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
3.1. Key rate for single-photon sources
With ideal single-photon sources, the secret key generation rate in the setups of
figures 1(a) and 1(b) is lower bounded by [63]
RQM = RSY
QM
11 [1− h(eQM11;X)− fh(eQM11;Z)], (3.1)
where efficient BB84 encoding is employed [47]. In the above equation, eQM11;X and e
QM
11;Z ,
respectively, represent the quantum bit error rate (QBER) between Alice and Bob in
the X and Z basis, when single photons are used, and Y QM11 represents the probability
that both memories are loaded with single photons of the same basis and the middle
BSM is successful.
To obtain the individual terms in equation ((3.1)), we can decompose the protocol
into two parts: the memory loading step and the measurement step, once both memories
are loaded. The first step is a probabilistic problem with two geometric random
variables, NA and NB, corresponding, respectively, to the number of attempts until
we load Alice and Bob’s memories with single photons. The number of rounds that it
takes to load both memories is then max{NA, NB}. Once both memories are loaded, the
rest of the protocol is similar to that of original MDI-QKD in terms of rate analysis: the
QMs replace the sources in figure 1(c) and the total transmission-detection efficiency is
replaced by the reading-measurement efficiency in the BSM module. We can therefore
use many of the relationships obtained for the original MDI-QKD, summarized in
Appendix B, for the memory-assisted versions of figure 1.
For finite values of T1, the reading efficiency for the Alice’s QM could be different
from that of Bob. In fact, we can assume that, once both memories are loaded, one
of the memories (late) will be read immediately, while the other (early) |NA − NB|
rounds after its successful loading. The effective measurement efficiency for the leg K,
K = A,B, corresponding to the path originating from memory K in the BSM module
will then be given by
ηmK =
{
ηm ≡ ηr0ηd, if memory K is late
ηd ηr(t = |NA −NB|T ), if memory K is early . (3.2)
With the above setting, and considering the required time for reading from the
QMs, we obtain
Y QM11 =
1
NL(η1A, η1B) +Nr
E{Y11(ηmA, ηmB)}
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=
1
NL(η1A, η1B) +Nr
Y11(ηm, η
′
m), (3.3)
where Y11 is the corresponding yield term, given by equation (B.4), for the MDI-
QKD protocol and NL = E{max(NA, NB)} is given by equation (C.3). Here, E{·}
represents the expectation value operator with respect to NA and NB, and η
′
m = ηdηr,
where ηr = ηr0E{exp(−|NA − NB|T/T1)} can be obtained from equation (C.4). In
equation (3.3), Nr, represents the extra rounds lost due to the nonzero reading times of
QMs, once they are both loaded, and is given by
Nr =
⌈
τr + τw
T
⌉
− 1, τr, τw > 0, τw ≤ T, (3.4)
where T = 1/RS is the repetition period. The condition τw ≤ T is a matter of
practicality as sending photons faster than they can be stored is of no benefit. The
fastest possible rate is then obtained at T = τw.
In the case of directly heralding memories of figure 1(a), we have
η1K = 1− (1− ηwηch(LK))e−ηwpBG , K = A,B, (3.5)
as the probabilities of successful loading of Alice and Bob’s QMs with single-photon
sources (or background noise). In the case of indirectly heralding memories of figure 1(b),
following our discussion in Section (2) about the equivalence of each leg of figure 1(b)
to an asymmetric MDI-QKD system, we have
η1K = Y11(ηdηch(LK), ηdηent), K = A,B, (3.6)
where the above terms must be calculated at an effective dark count rate of γdc +
γBGηd/2.
We remark that, although obtained from different methods, the analysis in [17] also
finds similar expressions for the yield term. In [17], the analysis is only concerned with
the symmetric setup, and some of the parameters considered in our work take their ideal
values. It can be verified, however, that in the special case of τw = T , τr = 0, γBG = 0,
LA = LB, ηw = 1, and T1 →∞, for directly heralding memories, equation (3.3) reduces
to the same result obtained in [17]. By accounting for additional relevant parameters,
our analysis offers a better match to realistic experimental scenarios.
Similarly, the error terms are given by
eQM11;Z = E{e11;Z(ηmA, ηmB, eQMdZ (η1A, η1B))}
= e11;Z(ηm, η
′
m, e
QM
dZ (η1A, η1B)),
eQM11;X = E{e11;X(ηmA, ηmB, eQMdX (η1A, η1B))}
≈ e11;X(ηm, η′m,E{eQMdX (η1A, η1B)}), (3.7)
where, e11;Z and e11;X , given by equation (B.4), are the corresponding error terms for
the original MDI-QKD. In addition to the typical sources of error, such as loss and
dark count, the above expressions are functions of misalignment parameters. This
misalignment could be a statistical error in the polarization stability of our setup,
modelled by edA and edB , or an effective misalignment because of memory dephasing
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[64] and/or background photons. Putting all these effects together, as we have done in
Appendix D, we obtain
eQMdS (ηA, ηB) = e
(A)
dS (ηA, ηB)(1− e(B)dS (ηA, ηB))
+ e
(B)
dS (ηA, ηB)(1− e(A)dS (ηA, ηB)), S = X,Z, (3.8)
where e
(A)
dS and e
(B)
dS , respectively, represent the misalignment probabilities for Alice’s
and Bob’s memories, for basis S = X,Z, at loading probabilities ηA and ηB and are
given by equations (D.2) and (D.5). The above equation accounts for the fact that if the
state of both memories are flipped, Alice and Bob will still share identical key bits. We
assume that the BSM module is balanced and does not have any setup misalignment.
Note that in equation (3.8), because of no dephasing errors for the Z eigenstates,
eQMdZ is independent of NA and NB, whereas e
QM
dX is a function of them. The
approximation in equation (3.7) assumes E{eQMdX ηmAηmB} ≈ E{eQMdX }E{ηmAηmB}, which
is valid when T1 ≫ T2, to give a more readable final result.
Equation (3.8) can also be used in the case of indirectly heralding QMs as explained
in Appendix D. The main idea is to use the analogy of each leg in figure 1(b) with the
original MDI-QKD in figure 1(c).
3.2. Key rate for decoy states
Suppose Alice and Bob use a decoy-state scheme with average photon numbers µ and
ν, respectively, for the two main signal intensities, and infinitely many auxiliary decoy
states. The secret key generation rate, in the limit of infinitely long key, is then given
by
RQM = RS[Q
QM
11 (1− h(eQM11;X))− fQQMµν;Zh(EQMµν;Z)], (3.9)
where
QQMµν;Z =
1
NL(ηµA, ηνB) +Nr
Y11(ηm, η
′
m) (3.10)
is the rate at which both memories are loaded, by Alice (Bob) sending a coherent state
in the Z basis with µ (ν) average number of photons, and a successful BSM is achieved.
In the case of directly heralding memories,
ηµA = 1− e−ηch(LA)ηwµ−ηwpBG and ηµB = 1− e−ηch(LB)ηwν−ηwpBG (3.11)
are the probabilities for successful loading of Alice and Bob’s QMs with coherent-state
sources. Similarly,
EQMµν;Z = e11;Z(ηm, η
′
m, e
QM
dZ (ηµA, ηνB)) (3.12)
is the QBER in the Z basis, and
QQM11 = Q
QM
µν;Z
η1Aη1B
ηµAηνB
µνe−µ−ν (3.13)
is the contribution of single-photon states in the gain term of equation (3.10).
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Similar to the treatment in the previous subsection, one can find or approximate
the above terms in the case of indirectly heralding memories as well. For the sake of
brevity, we leave this extension to the reader.
Apart from all additional parameters considered in our model as compared to [17],
our treatment of the decoy-state QKD is different from that of [17] in the way that QMs
are modelled. In our work, we assume QMs store qubits, which while is not necessarily
an exact model, it often serves a good first-order approximation to the reality. In [17],
however, QMs are assumed to be able to store number states. This assumption seems
more restrictive as many QMs, such as single trapped atoms or ions, can only store one
photon.
3.3. Storage time
To get some insight into the working of our system, in this section, we simulate the
achievable rates assuming LA = LB = L/2. The average number of trials to load both
memories from equation(C.3) is then given by [65]
NL(η, η) =
3− 2η
η(2− η) ≈
3
2
· 1
η
, for η ≪ 1, (3.14)
where η is the probability of successfully loading a QM at distance L/2, approximately,
given by ηQM exp(−(L/2)/Latt), where ηQM = ηw for directly heralding memories, and
ηQM = ηentη
2
d for indirectly heralding QMs. Similarly, the average required storage time,
from equation (C.5), is given by
Tst = E{|NA −NB|}T = 2(1− η)T
η(2− η) ≈
T
η
, for η ≪ 1, (3.15)
which is similar to the result reported in [17].
The secret key generation rate in equations (3.1) and (3.9) is proportional to the
pulse generation rate RS = 1/T at the encoder. To maximize RS, we choose T = τw,
throughout this section and next, resulting in Tst ≈ τw/η. Figure 3 compares Tst with
the required storage time in multi-memory probabilistic quantum repeaters [31], L/c,
where c is the speed of light in the channel. It can be seen that our scheme offers lower
required coherence times until a certain distance. With fast memories of shorter than
10 ns of access time, this crossover distance could be longer than 500 km. With such
memories, the required coherence time at 300 km is roughly 1 µs, or lower, as compared
to over 1 ms for probabilistic quantum repeaters.
It is worth mentioning that the possible advantage of requiring low coherence times
is only achievable for systems with nesting level one, i.e., with one stage of entanglement
swapping. Unlike quantum repeaters, our protocol, in terms of its timing, is not scalable
to higher nesting levels. Nevertheless, even with only one entanglement swapping stage,
our protocol can outperform conventional QKD schemes in terms of rate-versus-distance
behaviour, and, more importantly, this can possibly be achieved with existing technology
for quantum memories. We explore this and other aspects of our scheme in the next
section.
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Figure 3: Average required storage time, Tst, versus distance, in our scheme,
for different repetition rates 1/τw. As compared to that of a probabilistic
quantum repeater, labelled by L/c, where c = 2 × 108 m/s is the speed
of light in optical fibre, our scheme requires lower coherence times up to a
certain distance. The crossover distance at τw = 1 µs is over 300 km and at
τw = 1 ns is nearly 700 km. In all curves, ηw = ηd = ηent = 1 and pBG = 0.
4. Numerical Results
In this section, we study the impact of various parameters on the secret key generation
rate of our scheme. All results have been obtained assuming the symmetric setup
described in Section (3.3), τw = T , f = 1.16, c = 2 × 108 m/s, and 0.2 dB/km of loss
in the channel. We also compare our scheme with the efficient BB84 and MDI-QKD
protocols, whose secret key generation rates are, respectively, summarized in Appendices
A and B.
4.1. Coherence time
In this section, we discuss the effects of memory dephasing on the secret key generation
rate. As mentioned before, while our scheme in figure 1(a) is particularly resilient to
dark count errors, it still suffers from memory errors. Figure 4 demonstrates the secret
key generation rate per pulse at different coherence times for the scheme of figure 1(a).
A finite coherence time is the only source of nonideality considered in this figure. Since,
in our model, the dephasing process only affects the diagonal basis, eQM11;Z = 0 at all
distances; hence RQM ∝ 1 − h(eQM11;X) remains always positive. The rate is initially
proportional to exp(−(L/2)/Latt), and with low values of eQM11;X for short distances, our
scheme beats the BB84 case depicted by the dashed line. Note that, because of the
partial BSM in figure 2, the initial key rate at L = 0 for our scheme is lower than that
of BB84. At large distances, however, the dephasing process becomes significant and
results in eQM11;X approaching 1/2; see the inset. Subsequently, RQM decays with a faster
slope and at some point becomes lower than what one can achieve with an ideal BB84
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Figure 4: Secret key generation rate per pulse for the heralded scheme of
figure 1(a) for different values of T2/T using single-photon sources. The
dashed line represents the ideal efficient BB84 case. Unless explicitly
mentioned, all other parameters assume their ideal values: T1 → ∞,
ηw = ηr0 = ηd = 1, γBG = γdc = 0, edA = edB = 0, and τr = 0.
system. The window between the two crossing points on each curve is the range where
our scheme, can, in principle, beat a noise-free BB84 system. This window is larger for
QMs with longer coherence times.
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Figure 5: Secret key generation rate for different values of τw at T2/T = 1000
using single-photon sources. The dashed line represents the ideal efficient
BB84 case at RS = 1 Gpulse/s. Unless explicitly mentioned, all other
parameters assume their ideal values: T1 → ∞, ηw = ηr0 = ηd = 1,
γBG = γdc = 0, edA = edB = 0, and τr = 0.
In [17], authors look at the minimum required coherence time to achieve nonzero key
rates, assuming eQM11;X = e
QM
11;Z within their model of decoherence. Although the models
used for decoherence in our work and [17] are different, eQM11;X has a similar behaviour in
both cases. In our case, however, the transition from 0 to 1/2 is smoother than that of
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[17]. This is expected as the model in [17] is an abrupt good-bad model for the memory.
A consequence of this difference is that the minimum required coherence time is then
higher in our case, which highlights the importance of the more accurate model we have
used for decoherence.
The comparison in figure 4 assumes that the source rate RS is the same for both
the BB84 protocol and our scheme. In our scheme, however, RS depends on the writing
time of the memories. Figure 5 shows the secret key generation rate for the scheme of
figure 1(a) at a fixed value of T2/T = 1000, but for several values of T = τw = 1/RS.
The BB84 system is run at a fixed rate of 1 GHz. Again, we assume that the only source
of nonideality is memory dephasing. It can be seen that slow memories with writing
times of 100 ns, or higher, can hardly compete with an ideal BB84 system. The two
orders of magnitude lost because of the lower repetition rate cannot be compensated
within the first 300 km. It is still possible to beat the BB84 case, at long distances, if
memories have higher coherence times.
4.2. Realistic examples
It is interesting to see if any of the existing technologies for quantum devices can be
employed in our scheme to beat conventional QKD systems. Figure 6 makes such a
comparison between BB84, MDI-QKD, and memory-assisted MDI-QKD for particular
experimental parameters. We have chosen our QM parameters based on the two lessons
learned from figures 4 and 5: the QM needs to have a high bandwidth-storage product
(T2/τw) on the order of 1000 or higher, and, it also needs to be fast, with writing
times on the order of nanoseconds. Both these criteria are met for the QM used in
[44], which particularly offers fast reading and writing with 300-ps-long pulses at a
storage time of around 4 µs. The employed memory in this experiment is an atomic
ensemble, which fits our indirectly heralding scheme of figure 1(b). We should, however,
be careful with multiple excitations in this case, which are not considered in our model.
We therefore assume that, by driving this memory with short pulses, one can ideally
generate the jointly entangled state in equation (2.1) between the memory and a photon
[39], where, in this case, |sH〉 and |sV 〉 are, respectively, the corresponding symmetric
collective excited states to horizontal and vertical polarizations [15, 37]. By keeping
the entangling efficiency low at ηent = 0.05, here, we try to keep the effect of multiple
excitations in such memories low [35, 66, 64]; further analysis is, however, required to
fully account for such effects [45]. We also assume that T2 = T1 and use the state-of-
the-art single-photon detectors with ηd = 0.93 at γdc = 1 count per second and 150 ps
of time resolution [67] for all systems.
We consider two sets of parameter values for our employed QM in figure 6. In the
first set, corresponding to the curve labelled A on the figure, we use the same numerical
values as reported in [44], that is, ηr0 = 0.3, T1 = 4 µs, and τw = τr = τp = 300 ps. We,
however, assume that RS = 1/τw, which is much faster than the repetition rate used in
[44]. In the curve labeled B, we improve the performance by assuming ηr0 = 0.73,
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Figure 6: Secret key generation rate for single-photon BB84 (dotted), MDI-
QKD (dashed), and our indirectly heralding scheme of figure 1(b) (solid) at
practical parameter values. In all curves, ηd = 0.93, γdc = 1/s, γBG = 0,
and edA = edB = 0.005. For BB84 and MDI-QKD, RS = 3.3 G pulse/s,
similar to RS = 1/τw, in our scheme. For our scheme, we have used some
of the experimental parameters reported in [44]. For the curve labelled A,
ηent = 0.05, ηr0 = 0.3, T1 = T2 = 4 µs, and τw = τr = τp = 300 ps.
It is assumed that there is no multiple excitations in the QMs. For
the curve labelled B, everything is the same except that ηr0 = 0.73 and
T1 = T2 = 100 µs.
which is what another group has obtained for a similar type of memory [39], and
T1 = T2 = 100 µs, which is attainable by improving magnetic shielding [68]. It can
be seen that, whereas the current QM employed in [44] is short of beating either of
no-memory systems, our slightly boosted system, in curve B, outperforms both systems
at over roughly 200 km. The cut-off distance in curve B is about 400 km, which is
mainly because of memory decoherence, and it can be improved by using memories with
longer coherence times. This implies that with slightly improving some experimental
parameters, we would be able to employ realistic QMs to improve the performance of
practical quantum communication setups. We remark that the example QM chosen
in figure 6 is not necessarily the only option, and improved versions of other types of
memories can potentially offer the same performance [40, 61, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73].
What we have proposed here is an initial step toward improving the performance
of QKD systems by using quantum memories. In particular, we have shown how
technologically close we are to beating a direct, no-memory, QKD link in terms of
the achievable rate at certain long distances. Our scheme is not, however, scalable to
arbitrarily long distances. For that matter, full quantum repeaters would eventually be
needed. A possible roadmap for the development of such systems would pass through
probabilistic, and then deterministic, and eventually no-memory versions of quantum
repeaters [12, 13, 14]. It is hard to make a fair comparison between all these and
Memory-assisted measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution 18
our scheme, as the required resources in each case are different. Some studies have
nevertheless compared different repeater schemes under certain assumptions [74, 64].
It is only the future, in the end, that proves which system, and at what price, can be
implemented over the course of time.
5. Conclusions
By combining ideas from quantum repeaters and MDI-QKD, we proposed a QKD
scheme that relied on quantum memories. While offering the same rate-versus-distance
improvement that quantum repeaters promise, the coherence-time requirements for the
quantum memories employed in our scheme could be less stringent than that of a general
single-mode probabilistic quantum repeater system. That would provide a window
of opportunity for building realistic QKD systems that beat conventional no-memory
QKD schemes by only relying on existing technologies for quantum memories. In our
work, we showed that how close some experimental setups would be in achieving this
objective. Our protocol acts as a middle step on the roadmap to long-distance quantum
communication systems.
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Appendix A. BB84 Key Rate analysis
In this appendix we summarize the secret key generation rate for the efficient BB84
protocol [47] shown in figure A1. In figure A1, Alice is the transmitter sending pulses
in either the rectilinear or diagonal basis and Bob is the receiver, which decodes the
message. They communicate through an optical channel of distance L.
BB84 BB84
Encoder
L
Alice
Meas.
Bob
Figure A1: The setup for the BB84 protocol.
With a clock rate of RS, the secret key generation rate is lower bounded by
RBB84 = RSY1[1− h(e1)− fh(e1)], (A.1)
in the single-photon case, and
RBB84 = RS[Q1(1− h(e1))− fQµh(Eµ)], (A.2)
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in the (infinitely many) decoy-state case, where µ is the average number of photons
for signal states, which is dominantly used. In equation (A.1), Y1 is the yield of single
photons, or the probability that Bob gets a click on his measurement devices assuming
that Alice has sent exactly one photon, and is given by
Y1 = YC + YE = 1− (1− η)(1− pdc)2, (A.3)
where η = ηch(L)ηd, and
YC = (1−pdc/2)(η+(1−η)pdc) and YE = pdc[(1−η)(1−pdc/2)+η/2](A.4)
correspond, respectively, to the terms that, in the absence of misalignment, result in
identical (Correct) versus non-identical (Error) bits shared by Alice and Bob. The
QBER, e1, which is the same for both bases, is given by
e1Y1 = edYC + (1− ed)YE = e0Y1 − (e0 − ed)(YC − YE)
= e0Y1 − (e0 − ed)η(1− pdc), (A.5)
where e0 = 1/2 and ed = edA+edB is the total misalignment probability for the channel.
Similarly, in equation (A.2),
Q1 = Y1µe
−µ,
Qµ = QC +QE = 1− e−ηµ(1− pdc)2,
QC = (1− pdc/2)(1− e−ηµ + e−ηµpdc),
QE = pdc[e
−ηµ(1− pdc/2) + (1− e−ηµ)/2], (A.6)
are the corresponding gain terms [46], and
EµQµ = e0Qµ − (e0 − ed)(1− e−ηµ)(1− pdc), e0 = 1/2, (A.7)
gives the QBER.
Appendix B. MDI-QKD key rate analysis
The secret key generation rate for the MDI-QKD scheme of figure 1(c) is lower bounded
by [28]
RMDI−QKD = RSY11[1− h(e11;X)− fh(e11;Z)], (B.1)
in the single-photon case, and
RMDI−QKD = RS[Q11(1− h(e11;X))− fQµν;Zh(Eµν;Z)], (B.2)
in the decoy-state case, where µ (ν) is the average number of photons for signal states
sent by Alice (Bob). Here, Q11 is the probability of a successful BSM if Alice and Bob,
respectively, send pulses with µ and ν average number of photons and is given by
Q11(ηa, ηb) = µνe
−µ−νY11(ηa, ηb) (B.3)
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where ηa = ηch(LA)ηd and ηb = ηch(LB)ηd are transmission coefficients of each leg in
figure 1(c), and [28]
Y11(ηa, ηb) = (1− pdc)2
[ηaηb
2
+ (2ηa + 2ηb − 3ηaηb)pdc + 4(1− ηa)(1− ηb)p2dc
]
,
e11;X(ηa, ηb, ed)Y11(ηa, ηb) = e0Y11(ηa, ηb)− (e0 − ed)(1− pdc)2ηaηb/2,
e11;Z(ηa, ηb, ed)Y11(ηa, ηb) = e0Y11(ηa, ηb)− (e0 − ed)(1− pdc)2(1− 2pdc)ηaηb/2
(B.4)
with ed being the total misalignment probability. In the scheme of figure 1(c),
ed = edA(1 − edB) + edB(1 − edA). Similarly, using the results obtained in [28], we
have
Qµν;Z = Q
′
C +Q
′
E
Eµν;ZQµν;Z = edQ
′
C + (1− ed)Q′E , (B.5)
where
Q′C = 2(1− pdc)2e−µ
′/2
[
1− (1− pdc)e−ηaµa/2
] [
1− (1− pdc)e−ηbµb/2
]
Q′E = 2pdc(1− pdc)2e−µ
′/2[I0(2x)− (1− pdc)e−µ′/2]. (B.6)
In above equations, I0(x) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind and
x =
√
ηaµηbν/2, (B.7)
y = (1− pdc)e− 14 (ηaµ+ηbν), (B.8)
µ′ = ηaµ+ ηbν. (B.9)
Appendix C. Loading process
The loading process in the setups of figures 1(a) and 1(b) are probabilistic ones, with
two geometric random variables NA and NB playing the major role. Suppose the
success probability for each loading attempt corresponding to these random variables is,
respectively, given by ηA and ηB. Then, we obtain the following probability distribution
for |NA −NB|:
Pr(|NA −NB| = k) = [(1− ηA)k + (1− ηB)k]P0, k > 0, (C.1)
where
P0 = Pr(NA = NB) =
ηAηB
ηA + ηB − ηAηB . (C.2)
Using the above expressions, we then obtain
NL(ηA, ηB) = E{max(NA, NB)}
=
1
2
E{|NA −NB|+NA +NB}
=
1
2
[
ηA(1− ηB)
ηB(ηA + ηB − ηAηB) +
ηB(1− ηA)
ηA(ηA + ηB − ηAηB) +
1
ηA
+
1
ηB
]
.
(C.3)
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Moreover,
E{exp(−|NA−NB|δ)} = P0
[
1
1− e−δ(1− ηA) +
1
1− e−δ(1− ηB) − 1
]
(C.4)
and the average storage time, Tst, is given by
Tst = E{|NA−NB|}T = ηA(1− ηB)T
ηB(ηA + ηB − ηAηB)+
ηB(1− ηA)T
ηA(ηA + ηB − ηAηB) .(C.5)
Finally, we can show that
Pr{NA ≥ NB} = ηB
1− (1− ηA)(1− ηB) = 1− Pr{NA < NB} (C.6)
and
SA<B(δ) ≡
∞∑
1=na<nb
Pr{NA = na, NB = nb} exp[(na − nb)δ]
=
ηAηB(1− ηB)e−δ
[1− (1− ηB)e−δ][1− (1− ηA)(1− ηB)] . (C.7)
Appendix D. Misalignment Parameters
In this Appendix, we obtain the misalignment probability for each of the setups in
figures 1(a) and 1(b). Let us first consider the directly heralding memory case in the
Z basis and assume loading probabilities ηA and ηB for Alice’s and Bob’s memories.
Suppose the legitimate state is |sH〉〈sH|. Assuming setup misalignment probabilities
edK , K = A,B, for leg K of figure 1(a), in the absence of background counts, the stored
state in memory K will become ρd0 = (1− edK)|sH〉〈sH|+ edK |sV 〉〈sV |. Now, including
the background counts, the memory state will become
ρdZ = [1− e(K)BG ]ρd0 + e(K)BG
|sH〉〈sH |+ |sV 〉〈sV |
2
, (D.1)
where e
(K)
BG =
1−e−ηwpBG
ηK
, K = A,B, is the probability that our memory has been loaded
by a background (unpolarized) photon conditioned on a successful loading. The total
misalignment probability in the Z basis for the Alice’s and Bob’s memory is then given
by
e
(K)
dZ = edK(1−e(K)BG )+e(K)BG /2, K = A,B, for directly heralding QMs.(D.2)
Now, let’s assume the legitimate state, in the X basis, is |s+〉〈s+|, where |s±〉 =
(|sH〉 ± |sV 〉)/
√
2. Right after a successful loading, the state of the memory is then
given by
ρdX(0) = [1− e(K)BG ]ρ′d0 + e(K)BG
|sH〉〈sH |+ |sV 〉〈sV |
2
(D.3)
where ρ′d0 = (1 − edK)|s+〉〈s+| + edK |s−〉〈s−|. If memory A is the late memory, i.e., if
NA ≥ NB, then there will be no dephasing errors, in which case, e(A)dX = e(A)dZ . If it is the
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early memory, however, the dephasing operation in equation (2.3) will act on ρdX(0) to
give us
ρdX(t) = [1− e(K)BG ]ρ′d0(t) + e(K)BG
|sH〉〈sH |+ |sV 〉〈sV |
2
, (D.4)
where ρ′d0(t) = [(1 − edK)p(t) + edK(1 − p(t))]|s+〉〈s+| + [edKp(t) + (1 − edK)(1 −
p(t))]|s−〉〈s−|. The misalignment probability is then given by
e
(K)
dX = e
(K)
dZ + βAe
(K)
deph, (D.5)
where βK = (1− 2edK)(1− e(K)BG ), K = A,B, and
e
(A)
deph =
{
0 NA ≥ NB
(1/2)[1− exp(−|NA −NB|T/T2)] NA < NB , (D.6)
where NA and NB are geometric random variables with success probabilities ηA and ηB.
By averaging over these variables, we obtain
E{e(A)dX } = e(A)dZ + βAE{e(A)deph}, (D.7)
where
E{e(A)deph} = [Pr{NA < NB} − SA<B(T/T2)]/2, (D.8)
which can be obtained from equations (C.6) and (C.7). One can obtain similar
expressions for e
(B)
dX by swapping A and B in equations (D.6)–(D.8).
To calculate E{eQMdX } from equation (3.8), the final remaining term is given by
E{e(A)dX e(B)dX } = e(A)dZ e(B)dZ + βAE{e(A)deph}e(B)dZ + βBE{e(B)deph}e(A)dZ , (D.9)
where we used the fact that e
(A)
dephe
(B)
deph = 0, as one of the two terms is always zero
regardless of the values of NA and NB.
In the case of indirectly heralding QMs, we assume that each erroneous click on the
side BSMs will effectively result in a flip to the corresponding QM state, and can also
be modeled as misalignment. This assumption is valid at low distances where majority
of errors are caused by the setup misalignment. We then obtain
e
(K)
dZ = e11;Z(ηdηch(LK), ηdηent, edK), K = A,B, (D.10)
for indirectly heralding QMs, where e11;Z can be calculated from equation (B.4) at an
equivalent dark count rate of γdc+ηdγBG/2. At long distances, most errors originate from
dark counts or background photons, whose effective misalignment effect will approach
half of e11;Z in the above equation. As a conservative assumption, we use the expression
in equation (D.10) for all distances.
All other terms in equations (3.7) and (3.8) can be obtained following the same
expressions in eqations (D.5)–(D.9) at βK = 1 − 2e(K)dZ , for K = A,B, and using
equation (D.10) for e
(K)
dZ .
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